Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1981

Donald M. Stromquist and Janel. Stromquis v.
Clifford Cockayne, James C. Snow, Et al. v. Milton
Yorgason and Arthur L. Monson, Et al. :
Consolidated Brief of Appellants
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
BRIAN M. BARNARD; Attorneys for Appellants;WILLIAM THOMAS PETERS; Attorney for
Respndents;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Stromquist v. Salt Lake County, No. 16790 (Utah Supreme Court, 1981).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2016

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

I N T H E

S U P R E ME
0 F

S T AT E

C 0 U R T

T H E

0 F

UT AH

DONALD M. STROMQUIST and JANEL. STROMQUIST,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.

CLIFFORD COCKAYNE, Salt Lake County Assessor,
JAMES C. SNOW, Salt Lake County Auditor,
ARTHUR L. MONSON, Salt Lake County Treasurer,
WILLIAM DUNN, Salt Lake County Connnissioner,
WILLIAM HUTCHINSON, Salt Lake County
Commissioner, and PETE KUTULAS,
Salt Lake County Commissioner,

Case No. 16790

Defendants-Respondents.
DONALD M. STROMQUIST and JANEL. STROMQUIST,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.

MILTON YORGASON, Salt Lake County Assessor,
ARTHUR L. MONSON, Salt Lake County Treasurer,:
WILLIAM DUNN, Salt Lake County Commissioner,
WILLIAM HUTCHINSON, Salt Lake County
Commissioner, and ROBERT SALTER, Salt Lake
County Commissioner,

Case No. 16919

Defendants-Respondents.

CONSOLIDATED BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
A CONSOLIDATED APPEAL FROM ORDERS OF THE THIRD
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
DENYING THE PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
THE HONORABLE CHIRSTINE DURHAM AND THE HONORABLE BRYANT CROFT
JUDGES PRESIDING

BRIAN M. BARNARD
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City,
UTAH
84111

WILLIAM THOMAS PETERS
S?ecial Deputy Salt Lake
County Attorney
220 South Second East
Salt Lake City, UTAH 84111
AttorneySponsored
for byAppellants
Attorney
for
Respondents
the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of
Museum
and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I N T HE

S U P R E ME C O U R T
0 F

S T AT E

T H E

0 F

UT AH

DONALD M. STROMQUIST and JANEL. STROMQUIST,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.

CLIFFORD COCKAYNE, Salt Lake County Assessor,
JAMES C. SNOW, Salt Lake County Auditor,
ARTHUR L. MONSON, Salt Lake County Treasurer,
WILLIAM DUNN, Salt Lake County Commissioner,
WILLIAM HUTCHINSON, Salt Lake County
Commissioner, and PETE KUTULAS,
Salt Lake County Commissioner,

Case No. 16790

Defendants-Respondents.
DONALD M. STROMQUIST and JANEL. STROMQUIST,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.

MILTON YORGASON, Salt Lake County Assessor,
ARTHUR L. MONSON, Salt Lake County Treasurer,:
WILLIAM DUNN, Salt Lake County Commissioner,
WILLIAM HUTCHINSON, Salt Lake County
Commissioner, and ROBERT SALTER, Salt Lake
County Commissioner,

Case No. 16919

Defendants-Respondents.

CONSOLIDATED BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
A CONSOLIDATED APPEAL FROM ORDERS OF THE THIRD
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
DENYING THE PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
THE HONORABLE CHIRSTINE DURHAM AND THE HONORABLE BRYANT CROFT
JUDGES PRESIDING

WILLIAM THOMAS PETERS
Special Deputy Salt Lake
·county Attorney
'
220
South Second East
UTAH
84111
Salt Lake City, UTAH 84111
Attorney
Respondents
the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided
by the Institute for
of Museum
and Library Services
AttorneySponsored
for byAppellants
BRIAN M. BARNARD
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City,

Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . .

3

NATURE OF THE CASE . . .

6

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT. .

7

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

7

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .

8

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS . .

10

ARGUMENT.

14

Point I
SALT LAKE COUNTY OFFICIALS
ARE OBLIGATED TO COMPLY WITH
STATUTORY RESPONSIBILITIES .

14

Point II
THE FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH
THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
OF §59-5-30 OF THE UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED CARRIES WITH IT
SPECIFIC PENALTIES . . . . .

16

Point III
THE AGREEMENT TO REAPPRAISE
PROPERTY IN SALT LAKE COUNTY
DOES NOT JUSTIFY THE FAILURE
TO MEET THE STATUTORY DEALINE
IN 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . ·

18

Point IV
THERE WAS NO EXTENSION GRANTED
ALLOWING THE SALT LAKE COUNTY
ASSESSOR TO AVOID THE MAY 1,
1978 DEADLINE. . . . . . . . . . . . . · ·

22

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

Point V
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE
IS NOT SUFFICIENT UNDER
u.c.A. §59-5-30 (1953) . .

25

CON CL US ION . . . .

30
AUTHORITIES CITED
CASES

Equitable Life & Casualty Ins.
Companz: v. Schoewe, 105 U.
569, 1 4 P.2d 526 . . .

26

K.CoC. v. Salt Lake County,
575 P.Zd 705 (1977) . . .

25, 26, 27, 28

Petterson v. Ogden City,
111 U. 125, 176 P.2d 599.

26

Telonis v. Staley, 104 U. 537,
144 P.2d 513 . . . . . . .

26

STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated, (1953)
Section 17-36-31 . .
Section 59-5-30

27
. 9' 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16
17, 22, 25, 26, 28, 31, 32

Section 59-5-33 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 25, 26, 28
31
Section 59-5-46 .
. . 22, 23, 24
Section 59-5-109.
Section 59-8-7.

..

.
. .

20, 24
26

. . . .

Section 59-9-6.3
Section 59-11-7

. . . . .

27

. .

25, 26

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I N T H E S U P R E ME C 0 U R T
0 F

S T A T E

T H E

0 F

U T A H

DONALD M. STROMQUIST and
JANEL. STROMQUIST,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.

CLIFFORD COCKAYNE, Salt Lake
County Assessor, JAMES C.SNOW,
Salt Lake County Auditor,
ARTHUR L. MONSON, Salt Lake
County Treasurer, WILLIAM DUNN,
Salt Lake County Commissioner,
WILLIAM HUTCHINSON, Salt Lake
County Commissioner, and PETE
KUTULAS, Salt Lake County
Commissioner,

Case No. 16790

Defendants-Respondents.:

DONALD M. STROMQUIST and
JANE L. STROMQUIST,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.

MILTON YORGASON, Salt Lake
County Assessor, ARTHUR L.
MONSON, Salt Lake County
Treasurer, WILLIAM DUNN, Salt
Lake County Commissioner,
WILLIAM HUTCHINSON, Salt Lake
County Commissioner, ROBERT
SALTER, Salt Lake County
Commissioner,

Case No. 16919

Defendants-Respondents

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
I

NATURE OF THE CASE
These actions were filed seeking mandamus
and declaratory relief to,the effect that certain
elected Salt Lake County officials should be penalized,
including the forfeiture of wages and official bond,
for failure to comply with their statutory duties
regarding the preparation and the delivery of the tax
assessment book of Salt Lake County property for the
years 1978 and 1979.
The Plaintiffs-Appellants commenced the first
action in 1978 and the second action in 1979.

The

actions involve identical questions of law and name
as Defendants the holders of the same elected Salt Lake
County corporate officers and officials.

The question

of law is the imposition of penalties against the
elected Salt Lake County Assessor, Clifford Cockayne
for the year 1978, and Milton Yorgenson for the year
1979, for their failure to comply with statutory
deadlines regarding the preparation and delivery of
the Salt Lake County Tax Assessment book.
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In the interest of judicial economy and
justice these two appeals were consolidated for
the purpose of briefs and oral argument pursuant to
Stipulation of the parties and an Order entered by
this Court on March 17, 1980.

II
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Mutual Motions for Surmnary Judgment
concerning the year 1978 were heard on May 17, 1979.
The same mutual Motions concerning the year 1979
was heard on January 21, 1980.

The Third Judicial

District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah denied Plaintiffs-Appellants' Motion for Surmnary
Judgment and granted the Defendants-Respondents'
Motions for Sunnnary Judgment in both instances.

Both

Judgments were timely appealled by Plaintiffs-Appellants
herein.

III
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs-Appellants seek reversal of_
the Judgments below and a determination that the statutory

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

penalites be invoked for Defendants' failure to comply
with specific statutory deadlines.

IV
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
These actions were filed in the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County
seeking a declaration of Defendants-Respondents'
failure to comply with specific statutory duties and
deadlines; a ruling that the Defendants-Respondents
were subject to specific statutory penalties for this
failure; and an order requiring county officials to
enforce those penalties.
The Defendants-Respondents admit that they
failed to comply with statutory deadlines regarding
the preparation and delivery of the tax assessment
book for Salt Lake County property taxes for the years
1978 and 1979.

For the year 1978 the Defendants claim

that they could not meet the statutory deadline of the
first Monday in May because the Utah State Tax
Commission failed to complete the re-appraisal of all
of the property in Salt Lake County in a timely manner.
For the year 1979 the Defendants claim that they failed
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to meet the deadline "due to impossibility" of meeting
the statutory deadlines.
Mutual Motions for Summary Judgment were
argued to the Court.

For the year 1978 the Honorable

Christine Durham found that the statutory deadline
(U.C.A. §59-5-30, 1953) was "directory" in nature
rather than mandatory, that the Defendants had
substantially complied with the statutory requirements,
that the Utah State Tax Commission had granted a
"de facto" extension of time, and that the statutory
provision requiring that no compensation be paid the
Assessor "until said affidavit [of completion and
delivery of the tax assessment book] is made and
subscribed", meant that the wages were withheld not
forfeited, and could be paid when the Assessor finally
complied (in 1978, albeit four months late, with no
withholding of wages during the default).

For the year

1979 the parties stipulated that the Honorable Bryant
Croft could enter a Summary Judgment based upon, and in
conformance with, th~ prior ruling of Judge Durham for
the year 1978.
Plaintiffs-Appellants have appealed from both
rulings in this consolidated appeal.
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v
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

*

The Plaintiffs-Appellants are residents
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah and own real
property in the county.

The Appellants are tax payers

within Salt Lake County and were obligated to pay and
did pay taxes for the years 1978 and 1979 upon real
property in Salt Lake County.
The Appellants brought this action for
declaratory relief against certain elected Salt Lake
County officials regarding the failure of said officials
to comply with statutory deadlines regarding the
preparation and delivery of the tax assessment book for
Salt Lake County property taxes for the years 1978 and
1979.
The Defendants concede that they failed to
comply with statutory deadlines.
In responding to Requests for Admission and
Interrogatories the Defendant Cockayne admits that he
failed to complete his assessment book and deliver the
same to the Salt Lake County Treasurer on or before the
~~Footnote

The Trial Record in Case No. 16790 is cited as T.R.I;
The Trial Record in Case No. 16919 is cited as T.R.II.
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first Monday in May, 1978, as required and set forth
in U.C.A. §59-5-30 (1953). (T.R.I p. 26 and p. 33)
Said assessment book was delivered by the Defendant
Cockayne to the Salt Lake County Treasurer on or about
September 6, 1978. (T.R.I p. 31)
In responding to Requests for Admission and
Interrogatories the Defendant Yorgason admits that he
failed to complete his assessment book and deliver the
same to the Salt Lake County Treasurer on or before the
first Monday in May, 1979, (May 7, 1979) as required and
set forth in U.C.A. §59-5-30 (1953). (T.R.II p.28 and p.32)
Said assessment book was delivered by the Defendant
Yorgason to the Salt Lake County Treasurer on or about
July 30, 1979. (T.R.II p. 31 and p. 32).
The excuse for the delay for the year 1978
stated that the lateness was "totally the result of the
untimely manner in which the State Tax CoIImlission of
Utah conducted and implemented the reappraisal program
of Salt Lake County".

(T.R.I p. 31)

There was a

contract entered into by Salt Lake County and the Utah
State Tax Commission in 1976 to reappraise all property
in Salt Lake County with a tenative completion date of
June 30, 1978. (T.R.I pp. 109-118)
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The excuse for the delay for the year 1979
stated that the lateness was "due to impossibility"
(T.R.II p. 28) and "difficulties in trying to meet the
statutory deadlines and the impossibility thereof".
(T.R.II p. 29)
The Respondents indicated in their answers
to interrogatories that during the eight year period,
1972 through 1979 inclusive, that the Assessment book
had never been completed within the statutory deadline
of the first Monday in May.

(T.R.II p. 31)

The Respondents commencing at approximately
May 17, 1978 and continuing through May 14, 1979 had
correspondence with the Utah State Tax Commission
discussing the need and seeking permission to have
hearings and meetings of the Salt Lake County Board of
Equalization after the statutory deadline of June 20,
1978.

T.R.I pp. 66-103)
U.C.A. §59-5-33 (1953) provides that if an

assessor fails to comply with the first Monday in May
deadline as to completion of the assessment book that
he shall forfeit $1,000. from his official bond.

U.C.A.

§59-5-30 (1953) provides that if an assessor fails to
comply with the first Monday in May deadline as to
completion of the assessment book that he shall not be
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paid or draw any compensation for services until the
book is completed.
There are no specific statutory exceptions
or excuses or variances provided for the penalties
set forth in U.C.A. §59-5-33 or §59-5-30 (1953).
The Respondents admit that the Defendant
Cockayne continued to receive his salary from Salt Lake
County for services performed as Salt Lake County
Assessor from the first Monday in May, 1978, (May 1,
1978) through September 6, 1978 when he finally completed
the Assessment book (T.R. I p.26).

There has been no

forfeiture against the official bond of the Defendant
Cockayne as set forth in U.C.A. §59-5-33 (1953). (T.R.I
pp. 45-46)

None of the Defendants have taken any action

to seek forfeiture under the bond or to collect or retake the salary paid to the Defendant Cockayne for the
period between May 1, 1978 and September 6, 1978. (T.R.I
pp. 45-46).
The Respondents admit that the Defendant
Yorgason continued to receive his salary from Salt Lake
County for services performed as Salt Lake County
Assessor from the first Monday in May, 1979, (May 7, 1979)
through July 30, 1979 when he finally completed the
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the Assessment book (T.R.II p.29 and p. 33).

There has

been no forfeiture against the official bond of the
Defendant Yorgason as set forth in U.C.A. §59-5-33
(1953).

(T.R.II p.34).

None of the Defendants have

taken any action to seek forfeiture under the bond or
to collect or re-take the salary paid to the Defendant
Yorgason for the period between May 7, 1979 and July 30,
1979.

(T.R.II p.29).
The Appellants are not seeking any determination

or ruling with regard to the validity of the property tax
assessments made by the Respondents for the year 1978 or
1979.

VI
ARGUMENT
Point I
SALT LAKE COUNTY OFFICIALS ARE OBLIGATED
TO COMPLY WITH STATUTORY RESPONSIBILITIES
The applicable statute in the instant case
is U.C.A. §59-5-30 (1953) which provides in pertinent
part as follows:
59-5-30. Assessor to complete assessment
book and subscribe affidavit.--On or
before the first Monday of May in each
year the assessor must complete his
assessment book and deliver the same to
the County Treasurer. He must take and
subscribe an affidavit in the assessment
book to be substantially as follows:
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I,---------, the assessor of --------County, do swear that before the first
Monday in May, 19--, I made diligent
inquiry and examination, and visited
and inspected, either personally or by
deputy, all of the property within the
county subject to assessment by me; that
the same has been assessed on the assessment
book equally and uniformly according to
the best of my judgment, information and
belief, at thirty per cent of its reasonable
fair cash value; that I have faithfully
complied with all the duties imposed on
the assessor under the revenue laws; and
that I have not imposed any unjust or
double assessments through malice or ill
will or otherwise, or allowed anyone to
escape a just and equal assessment through
favor or reward, or otherwise.
The assessor shall not be paid or draw any
compensation for services after the first
Monday in May of each year, until said
affidavit is made and subscribed. A
failure to make or subscribe such affidavit,
or any affidavit, will not in any manner
affect the validity of the assessment.
[emphasis added]
The Respondents Cockayne and Yorgason were the
Salt Lake County Assessors at times pertinent to these
actions and were charged with certain statutory duties
as Assessor.

The Respondents have failed to comply with

the statutory duties imposed upon them by U.C.A. §59-5-30
(1953), as amended; specifically, the respective assessment
books were not completed and delivered to the Salt Lake
County Treasurer as required on the first Monday in May
in 1978 or in 1979.
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There are no specific statutory exceptions
or variances or excuses provided regarding the noncompliance with U.C.A. §59-5-30 (1953) by a County
Assessor.

Point II
THE FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE STATUTORY
PROVISIONS OF §59-5-30 OF THE UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED CARRIES WITH IT SPECIFIC PENALTIES
U.C.A. §59-5-33 (1953), as amended, provides
in pertinent part as follows:
59-5-33. Penalty for neglect to complete
assessment book.--Every assessor who fails
to complete and deliver his assessment
book to the County Treasurer within the
time prescribed by law, [U. C .A. 59-5-30
(1953): the first Monday of May in each
year] ... shall forfeit the sum of $1,000,
to be recovered on his official bond, for
the use of the county, or to be deducted
from his salary by the Board of County
Commissioners.
U.C.A. §59-5-30 (1953) as set forth above
provides another penalty for the non-complying Assessor
in that he "shall not be paid or draw any compensation
for services after the first Monday in May of each year,
until said affidavit [of completion and delivery of the
assessment book] is made and subscribed."
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There are no specific statutory exceptions
or variances or excuses provided to avoid the penalties
of U.C.A. §59-5-30 or §59-5-33 (1953), loss of salary and
forfeiture from the official bond.
The Respondents argued in the Court below and
the Court found that the language of U.C.A. §59-5-30 (1953)-The assessor shall not be paid or draw any
compensation for services after the first
Monday in May of each year, until said
affidavit [of completion and delivery of
the assessment book] is made and subscribed.
directed a "postponement" of payment of salary rather
than:a "forfeiture" of salary.

If the legislature had

desired a postponement clear language to that effect
could have been used.

Instead the legislature choose to

direct that the assessor shall not be paid or draw any
compensation during the period of his non-compliance.
This provision should be read in conjunction with the
clear forfeiture language of U.C.A. §59-5-33 (1953);
that statute does not say the forfeiture shall be
I

nullified and the money returned when the assessment
book is completed.

Logical construction of the two

statutes must be to the effect that severe and strict
penalties were to be extracted when there was noncompliance by an assessor, forfeiture of salary and from
the official bond.
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Point III
THE AGREEMENT TO REAPPRAISE PROPERTY IN SALT
LAKE COUNTY DOES NOT JUSTIFY THE FAILURE TO
MEET THE STATUTORY DEADLINE IN 1978
The agreement between the Utah State Tax
Commission and Salt Lake County to reappraise all the
property in Salt Lake County and the delay in the
completion of that contract does not justify the failure
of the assessor to meet the statutory deadline in the
completion of his assessment book for the year 1978.
The contract was entered into on April 1, 1976.

Time

was not of the essence in the performance of the contract.
By its own terms there was no specific deadline for the
performance.

The parties hoped that the work would be

completed in time to include the reappraisals in the 1978
calendar year assessment rolls, but there was no guarantee.
Various provisions of the contract make it clear that
there was no deadline:
It is contemplated that the reappraisal program
hereunder shall be completed in time for use
and incorporation into the 1978 calendar year
assessment rolls, levy and ta.~ collection;
provided, however, that this time may be
extended by the written mutual agreement of
the parties; . . .
(T. R. I, p. 111)
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Further, that such reappraised properties
shall not be incorporated into the assessment
roll until all of the properties located in
Salt Lake County . . . have been completely
reappraised. . .
(T.R.I, p. 110)
The County hereby agrees to incorporate in
its calendar year 1978 assessment roll if
~the reappraisal program is] completed: or
in such subsequent year as the reappraisal
program is finally completed, . . . the
assessed valuations arrived at in the
reappraisal program. (T.R.I, pp.115-116)
The most telling provision of the contract is
the time set for the final payment of money from the
County to the State Tax Cormnission for their services.
Appendix I to the contract contemplates that the final
payment for services will be on or before June 30, 1978,
but goes on to say
In no event will the final payment due from
the County to Cormnission under the reappraisal
program be due or payable until the entire
reappraisal program for Salt Lake County has
been completed in full and incorporated into
the tax rolls of Salt Lake County. (T.R.I, p.118)
The deadline for the County Assessor to complete
his assessment book was May 1, 1978 and the reappraisal
contract had an anticipated completion date of June 30, 1978.
Although the reappraisal contract appears to be
a contract for services from the Utah State Tax Commission
to be rendered for the County of Salt Lake, the contract
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really is a mutual agreement spelling out the responsibilitie
of the two entities in reappraising the property within
Salt Lake County.

(See U.C.A.§59-5-109 (2), 1953).

The

Utah State Tax Commission was to work closely with Salt
Lake County officials to reappraise the property.

The

costs of the reappraisal was to be bourne 70% by the State
Tax Commission and 30% by Salt Lake County.

(T.R.I p.113).

When the reappraisal was not completed by the
May 1, 1978 deadline, the Salt Lake County Assessor should
have completed his assessment book using the information
available to him from the proceeding year.

This was

contemplated by the reappraisal contract and the law.
The Respondents claim that in 1978 noncompliance was not the result of their failure but was
"totally the result of the untimely manner" in which the
State Tax Commission conducted and implemented the
reappraisal program for Salt Lake County.

The Defendants

allege that the Commission failed to live up to the terms
of the agreement.

Even if this were true, that contract

does not supercede the statutory duty of the assessor to
make his May l, 1978 deadline.

That point was covered in

the contract:
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The parties to this Agreement recognize that
each such party has certain constitutional
and statutory powers and duties relating to
the assessment of property and do hereby
agree that nothing contained in this
Agreement shall be construed as having
limited, expanded, transferred, abrogated
or relinquished any such powers or duties
from or by one party to the other. (T.R.I p.115)
The signing of the contract between Salt Lake
County and the State Tax Commission in no way could alter
the statutory obligations of the assessor.
The fallacy of Respondents argument as to the
cause of the delay in 1978 is shown by the Answers to
Interrogatories by the Defendant Milton Yorgason regarding
the failure to meet the deadline for the year 1979.

He

said "The assessment roll was not completed by the first
Monday in May because it was physically impossible to do
so".

(T.R.II p. 31)

He goes on to tell us:

The record shows that the assessment rolls
were completed on the dates as follows in
previous years:
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978

-

July 28
July 8
July 13
July 11
August 2
July 20
August 29

(T.R.II, p.31)
Even if Salt Lake County had not been in the middle of a
reappraisal program in 1978, the track record of the Salt
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Lake County Assessors Office shows that it probably
would not have completed the assessment book within
the statutory deadline.

Point IV
THERE WAS NO EXTENSION GRANTED ALLOWING
THE SALT LAKE COUNTY ASSESSOR TO AVOID
THE MAY 1, 1978 DEADLINE
The Respondents claim and the Court below
found that for the year 1978 the State Tax Commission
had granted a de facto extension of the May 1, 1978
deadline.

(T.R.I p. 65)
There is no specific statutory authority that

would allow the State Tax Commission to grant such an
extension.

The State Tax Commission does have broad

supervisory powers regarding taxation within the state
(U.C.A. §59-5-46, 1953), however, no where is the
Commission granted the power to repeal legislation.
U.C.A. §59-5-30 (1953) provides a specific deadline and
was enacted by the legislature; the State Tax Commission
is not granted the power to waive compliance with that
statutory deadline or to repeal that law.

U.C.A §59-5-46

(2) and (3), (1953) prohibit the Tax Commission from
adopting rules or regulations in conflict with state law.
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There is no mention at all of any extension
of the May 1, 1978 deadline in any of the evidence
presented to the Court below.

The Respondents asked

for and received permission to hold Board of Equalization
hearings after the statutory deadline of June 20, 1978.
The State Tax Commission has specific power to grant such
an extension (U.C.A. §59-5-46 (10), 1953)
was granted by the State Tax Commission.

That permission
(T.R.I pp.66-103)

Hearings by the Board of Equalization are a distinct
stage in assessment and taxation of property which occurrs
after the Assessor has completed and delivered his
assessment book.

Between May 17, 1978 and May 14, 1979

there was a series of letters between the Salt Lake
Auditor and the State Tax Commission regarding holding
the Board of Equalization hearings after the statutory
deadline.

(T.R.I pp. 66-103)

Those letters show that

(1) there is a statutory procedure to have Board of
Equalization hearings late, (2) the State Tax Commission
has the power to allow Board of Equalization hearings
to be held late, and (3) the Salt Lake County officials
did not bother to correspond with the State Tax Commission
about Board of Equalization hearings being late until
May 17, 1978, more than two weeks after the Salt Lake
County Assessor had missed his May 1, 1978 deadline.
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If the State Tax Commission had the power to
waive or extend the May 1, 1978 deadline, why did not
the County and the Commission specifically do that in
writing?
There is no grant of power to the State Tax
Commission in general or under the re-evaluation program
(U.C.A. §59-5-46 and §59-5-109, 1953) allowing extensions
of the statutory May deadline of the Salt Lake County
Assessor.

The terms of the contract between the County

and the Tax Commission as discussed above provided for
the distinct probability that the reappraisal work would
not be done by May l, 1978.

The terms of the contract

clearly stated that the Tax Commission was not taking on
or changing any of the statutory obligations of the
county officials.

(T.R.I p. 115)

There was no evidence of an extension granted
to the Salt Lake County Assessor for the year 1978 and
the Utah State Tax Commission did not have the power to
grant any such extension.

The fact of the matter is,

based on the record before the Court, there was no
discussion or mention of any such extension by the County
or the Tax Commission.
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Point V
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE IS NOT SUFFICIENT
UNDER U.C.A. §59-5-30 (1953)
The Respondents allege that this Court has
indicated that the time limitations set forth in taxing
statutes are directory rather than mandatory and
substantial compliance therewith is sufficient.

They

cite U.C.A. §59-11-7 (1953) and K.C.C. vs Salt Lake
County, 575 P. 2d 705 (1977) as authority for their
position.
The Respondents reliance upon U.C.A §59-11-7
(1953) is misplaced; that section provides as follows:
No assessment or act relating to assessment
or collection of taxes is illegal on account
of informality or because the same was not
completed within the time required by law.
The Appellants are not seeking a declaration that any
Respondent did anything illegal or that the 1978 or 1979
property taxes or the assessment thereof is illegal.

The

Appellants are seeking a determination that certain
specific statutory penalties be invoked for failure to
comply with specific statutory deadlines.

The specific

penalty provisions of §59-5-30 and §59-5-33 (1953) must
supercede the general disclaimer of U.C.A §59-11-7 (1953).
The Court must interpret statutes in such a way as to
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give them meaning rather than to create nonsense of them
as the Respondents suggest.

U.C.A. §§59-5-30 and 59-5-33

(1953) would be meaningless and of no sense, if U.C.A.
§59-11-7 (1953) was interpreted as Respondents suggest.
Furthermore, U.C.A. §59-11-7 (1953) has been
construed and a determination made that the failure of
an auditor to prepare and sign an affidavit of compliance
as required by U.C.A. §59-8-7 (1953) is a fatal defect
and is not a mere "informality" of the nature contemplated
in §59-11-7 (1953).

Telonis vs. Staley, 104 U. 537, 144

P. 2d 513; Equitable Life & Casualty Ins. Company vs.
Schoewe, 105 U. 569, 144 P.2d 526; Petterson vs. Ogden
City, 111 U. 125, 176 P. 2d 599.
In the case at bar, the Respondent assessors
did not submit their required affidavits (U.C.A. §59-5-30,
1953) in timely fashions; they could not do so because
of their failure to act within statutory limits.

Clearly

those delays are not of the type and nature contemplated
by U.C.A. §59-11-7 (1953) but were fatally defective
errors beyond the protection of that section.
The case of K.C.C. vs. Salt Lake County, 575
P. 2d 705 (1977) is relied upon by the Respondents in
their assertion that substantial compliance of statutory
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deadlines for tax assessment is sufficient.

That case

involved a statute setting a deadline for a county
commission to perform its statutory duty in levying
a property tax.

The statutes involved were U.C.A.

§§59-9-6.3 and 17-36-31 (1953); both of these statutes
provide deadlines; however, there are no penalties set
forth for the failure of the county officials to comply.
Both statutes used the word "shall" in setting the
deadlines, which has been construed to mean the same as
"must" which is used in the statutes requiring the
Respondents Cockayne and Yorgason to act in the case at bar.
K.C.C. vs. Salt Lake County stands for the
proposition that a statutory requirement (either must, will
or shall), such as the deadline for Respondent Assessors
will be considered directory rather than mandatory if:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

The purpose of the statute has been
substantially complied with; and
No substantial rights have been
jeopardized; and
There are no negative words or limits
within the statutory scheme regarding
non-compliance; and
The statute was merely a guide for the
conduct of business in an orderly
fashion; and
The purpose of the statute was not to
protect the taxpayer.

The crucial points in the case at bar are
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(1)

the existence of two penalty provisions against the

Respondents, who were the Salt Lake County Assessors,
and (2)

whether a delay of duration involved here under

the statutory scheme may be said to be "substantial
compliance".
Why would the Utah State Legislature enact
the penalty provisions of U.C.A. §§59-5-30 and 59-5-33
(1953) unless they wanted the County Assessor to act on
time or pay a penalty.

The doctrine of "substantial

compliance" may apply where there is no statutory
penalty, but it cannot apply to negate specific
legislatively enacted "punishments".
Another reason why the case of K.C.C. vs.
Salt Lake County is not applicable to the case at bar
is the nature of the relief sought.

In that case,

Kennecott Copper Corporation was challenging the
validity of a tax and seeking a refund of taxes paid.
The Appellants in this case, Donald and Jane Stromquist,
are only seeking a declaratory judgment that the statutory
timetables were not met and that the Respondents are
subject to specific statutory penalties; they are not
seeking a refund or a ruling as to the validity of the
tax or its assessment.
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The only two viable defenses that the
Respondents have asserted are (1) substantial
compliance and (2) the State Tax Commission's delay
in 1978.

Neither of those defenses can stand in light

of the penalties specifically enacted and directed
against the Respondent Assessors.

An attempt to

assert the substantial compliance defense or excuse
the delay because of the State Tax Commission's action
is an attempt to erase from the law the specific
penalties enacted (with good reason) by the Utah State
Legislature.
The State Tax Commission does not have the
power to excuse non-conformance with the statutory
requirement and waive the deadline imposed by law.

The

fact that the State Tax Commission was late in 1978
(assuming that only for the sake of argument) in their
re-appraisal, is not an excuse recognizable by statute
or by this Court for non-compliance.
In the Answers to Interrogatories by the
Respondent Milton Yorgason the real reason for the delays
comes out; "it was physically impossible" to meet the
deadline, and no Assessor in Salt Lake County has met the
deadline for seven

y~ars.

(T.R.II p. 31)

The attempt to
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blame the delay on the Tax Commission for the year 1978
is a sham.

The truth is that the Assessor's Office

has routinely and annually ignored the law.

When

challenged the Assessor came up with two excuses: (1)
blame the State Tax Commission and (2)
substantially complied".

"we've

Neither excuse is valid nor

sufficient in light of the· specific statutory penalties
to be extracted.

CONCLUSION
There is no statutory provision allowing the
Respondent Assessors to avoid the statutory deadline to
complete their assessment book on or before the first
Monday in May of each year.

The State Tax Commission

does not have the authority to repeal the deadline or
waive compliance, and even if they did have that authority,
they did not grant an extension or waive compliance for
either 1978 or 1979.
Substantial compliance is not sufficient when
a statutory deadline is provided and a specific penalty
for non-compliance is set forth.
The Summary Judgments granted the Respondents
below should be reversed and the matters should be
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remanded to the Court below with instructions to enter
judgment in favor of the Appellants declaring that:
1)

the statutory deadlines of U.C.A. §59-5-30

(1953) imposed upon the Respondent Assessors
were not met in the year 1978 and 1979;
2)

there was no recognizable excuse for the

Respondent Assessors non-compliance with the
statutory deadline of U.C.A. §59-5-30 (1953);
3)

the Respondent Assessors are subject to

the penalty provisions of U.C.A. §59-5-30 and
§59-5-33 (1953);
4)

the Respondent Assessors were wrongfully

paid their wages and salaries for the period
of their non-compliance with U.C.A. §59-5-30
(1953):
5)

the respondent County Commissioners should

be ordered to institute proceedings against the
official bonds of the Respondent Assessors for
forfeiture pursuant to the terms of U.C.A
§59-5-33 (1953); and
6)

the Respondent County Commissioners should

be ordered to institute proceedings against the
Respondent Assessors to recover the wages and
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salary wrongfully paid to these Assessors
for the period of their non-compliance
with U.C.A. §59-5-30 (1953).

DATED this 21st day of April, 1980.

Respectfully submitted,

BRIAN M. BARNARD
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone: (801) 328-9531

I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of
the foregoing Consolidated Brief of Appellants to William
Thomas Peters, Special Deputy County Attorney, Counsel
for the Defendants-Respondents, 220 South Second East,
Salt Lake Cit~, Utah 84111, postage prepaid in the United
States Postal Service on the date written above.
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